Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-69*

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Writing in the late 1940s, V. O. Key predicted that such factors as urbanization, Negro out-migration, and the spread of commerce and industry would gradually "create conditions favorable to [political] change"[1] in the American South. In the years since Key wrote, the southern economy has been steadily moving "from rural-

[1]V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 674-675.

agricultural to urban-industrial."[2] Only a tenth of the region's labor force was employed in agriculture by 1960, a decline of almost 60 percent since 1940. Out-migration reduced the percentage of blacks in the 1960 southern population to 21 percent, and majorities of both blacks (58 percent) and whites (56 percent) resided in urban areas. Socio-economic changes such as these, together with a series of challenges to the South's caste system of race relations, have produced a "slow-moving social revolution of significant proportions."[3]

Concentrating on the period from 1950 to 1969, this paper attempts to document and assess the views of one set of white politicians in the South concerning two aspects of this "social revolution"—racial segregation and the role of state governments vis-a-vis economic development. The theoretical importance of elite studies is readily apparent from Key's research. In *Southern Politics* he argued persuasively that the region had constructed "no system or practice of political organization and *leadership* adequate to cope with its problems."[4] A decade later Key reached the general conclusion that "the critical element for the health of a democratic order consists in the beliefs, standards, and competence of those who constitute the influentials, the opinion-leaders, the political activists in the order."[5] The broad question raised here concerns the ways in which white politicians, in an era of rapid socio-economic change, have dealt with two policy areas of great substantive importance. To oversimplify somewhat, we are investigating the extent to which the South has begun to acquire "leadership adequate to cope with [some of] its problems."

Our focus on white elites is also designed to help fill a gap in the literature of contemporary southern politics. White politicians possess an important but comparatively neglected perspective on

[2]James G. Maddox *et al., The Advancing South: Manpower Prospects and Problems* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), 22. Statistics used in the first paragraph are drawn from this source, 23-27.

[3]*Ibid.*, 19.

[4]Key, *Southern Politics*, 4. Emphasis added.

[5]V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), 558.

political change.[6] A great deal has been written about the political activities of black southerners at both the elite and mass levels,[7] but there has been no systematic, long-range study of white political elites. These politicians deserve scrutiny, if for no better reason than that they have monopolized state offices in the past and seem likely to do so indefinitely. The white elite under consideration consists of all politicians elected governor from 1950 to 1969 in the 11 ex-Confederate states.[8] Governors were chosen for study because their role as chief executive has frequently made them cen-

[6]The most comprehensive history of white political activists during the 1950s is Numan V. Bartley, *The Rise of Massive Resistance* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969). There are several useful but specialized studies of white southern politicians. See, e.g., Marshall Frady, *Wallace* (New York: World, 1968); Robert Sherrill, *Gothic Politics in the Deep South* (New York: Grossman, 1968); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, *Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966* (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1968); James R. Soukup, Clifton McCleskey, and Harry Holloway, *Party and Factional Division in Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964); James W. Silver, *Mississippi: The Closed Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964); Walter Lord, *The Past That Would Not Die* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Howard H. Quint, *Profile in Black and White* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958); William C. Havard, Rudolf Heberle, and Perry H. Howard, *The Louisiana Elections of 1960* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963); and A. J. Liebling, *The Earl of Louisiana* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961).

[7]See, e.g., Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); Harry Holloway, *The Politics of the Southern Negro* (New York: Random House, 1969); H. D. Price, *The Negro and Southern Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); Everett C. Ladd, *Negro Political Leadership in the South* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); William Keech, *The Impact of Negro Voting* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Andrew Buni, *The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965* (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1967); Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power* (New York: Random House, 1967); Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, *Climbing Jacob's Ladder* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967); and Howard Zinn, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

[8]This paper is drawn from a larger study, now in progress, of southern governors and the Negro since 1950. Here our attention will be limited to *successful* southern politicians. No attempt will be made in this paper to compare the policy orientations of successful with unsuccessful candidates, to delve into the intricacies of campaign strategy, or to relate the views of campaigners to their performance in office.

tral figures in racial conflict and in matters affecting economic development.

To reduce the topic to manageable size and to facilitate longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons, the orientations of white politicians concerning racial segregation and economic development will be ascertained through an examination of their campaign rhetoric. Since all governors campaign for public office, campaign rhetoric may be utilized as a common and accessible indicator of the elite policy views we wish to assess. It must be stressed, however, that the concern of this paper is not with political campaigns as such, but rather with two analytic topics assumed to be present in campaigns and to vary over time—racial segregation and economic development. These particular issues were selected because the caste system and the comparative lack of economic development have long been recognized as fundamental regional problems. Because of the difficulty of devising typologies applicable to politicians across 11 states over a 20-year period, our analysis will be confined to two policy issues considered especially useful for an understanding of white elites. Clearly racial segregation and economic development have not been the only important issues in southern campaigns, but they have been significant ones, with implications for the nature of race relations and for the allocation of economic resources.

Although our interest is limited to two policy fields, we shall try to compensate for this narrow focus by examining all of the region's governors over a reasonably lengthy and highly eventful period in southern history. The particular question we are asking may be expressed as follows: Among those white southern politicians who have won governorships, what changes in attitudes toward racial segregation and economic development have become apparent since 1950?

Using terms employed by Matthews and Prothro, we have controlled regional findings for differences between two subregions, the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) and the Peripheral South (Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).[9] Previous research has

⁹Matthews and Prothro, *New Southern Politics*, 169.

established the importance of sub-regional comparisons. With regard to white political behavior, Matthews and Prothro used survey data to show that Deep South whites were more committed to "strict segregation" and less aware of the true racial attitudes of blacks than were Peripheral South whites.[10]   Cosman, analyzing the 1964 presidential election, found Peripheral South whites less willing to vote on the basis of racial prejudice than whites in the Deep South.[11]   Distinctive sub-regional patterns, it will be demonstrated, exist for white politicians as well as for whites generally.

Since any conclusions rest upon the accuracy of the original classifications, the procedures used to code individuals need to be elaborated.   Data on the governors' campaign stances have been gathered primarily from state newspapers.[12]   Because southern newspapers vary widely in terms of the frequency, comprehensiveness, and biases of their campaign coverage, the more elaborate techniques of content analysis were not considered appropriate. No attempt has been made to produce generalizations on the order of "Governor A advocated defiance of the *Brown* decision in twice as many speeches as Governor B."   We are essentially concerned with the substance of a politician's references to racial segregation and economic development.   To determine these policy orientations, two newspapers were selected for each state and all articles pertaining to a given gubernatorial election, including reports of stump speeches, television addresses, profiles of candidates, and the like, were read.   For Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where coverage seemed adequate or where a second newspaper

[10]*Ibid.,* 355-357.

[11]Bernard Cosman, *Five States for Goldwater* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1966), 120-125 and *passim.*

[12]The following newspapers were used: Birmingham *News* and Montgomery *Advertiser* (Alabama); *Arkansas Gazette* (Arkansas); Miami *Herald,* Tampa *Tribune,* and St. Petersburg *Times* (Florida); Atlanta *Constitution* and Atlanta *Journal* (Georgia); New Orleans *Times-Picayune* (Louisiana); Raleigh *News and Observer* and Charlotte *Observer* (North Carolina); Jackson *Clarion-Ledger* (Mississippi); Columbia *State* and Charleston *News and Courier* (South Carolina); Nashville *Banner,* Nashville *Tennessean,* and Memphis *Commercial Appeal* (Tennessee); Dallas *Morning News,* Houston *Post,* and *Texas Observer* (Texas); and Richmond *Times-Dispatch* and Washington *Post* (Virginia).

was unobtainable, a single source was used. Campaign reportage was followed on a day-by-day basis for each stage (Democratic first primary, Democratic second primary, and, when closely contested, the general election) of the southern electoral process. Coverage typically began some six weeks before the first primary. Depending upon whether a second primary was necessary to determine the Democratic nominee and whether a Republican actively sought the office, each campaign was followed for a period of six to fourteen weeks. As stories were read, notes (ranging from lengthy quotations to brief comments) were taken on the policy stances of each politician. Using these notes and applying criteria to be specified shortly, southern governors were then classified according to their campaign stances on racial segregation and economic development. Classifications of individual governors are listed in the appendix.

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND RACIAL SEGREGATION

With respect to southern electoral politics, the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision ultimately accomplished what the white primary and FEPC controversies of the 1940s failed to achieve: the revival of an extraordinarily divisive issue—the "place" of the Negro—that most white southerners had considered settled beyond challenge. There might be differences of style, tone, and emphasis, but white politicians in the years before *Brown* v. *Board of Education* were united by "a common resolve indomitably maintained—that it shall be and remain a white man's country."[13] It seems worthwhile, therefore, to examine systematically the white politician's historic commitment to racial segregation during the years in which the legal basis for the caste system was destroyed. If southern racial traditions *have* been appreciably altered since 1954, this change should be discernible in the rhetoric of successful candidates for the governorship.

In terms of racial segregation, governors will be categorized as *strong* or *militant segregationists, moderate segregationists,* or *non-*

[13]Ulrich B. Phillips, "The Central Theme of Southern History," *American Historical Review,* 34 (October 1928), 31.

segregationists. Since the purpose of the analysis is to gauge change (or continuity) in southern racial norms, the typology has been designed to identify the point at which winning candidates for a major state office, as a practical matter, cease to campaign as racial segregationists. Failure to advocate and defend the caste system will be regarded as a significant break with tradition, whether or not such politicians openly align themselves with efforts to end racial segregation. No nominal classification of this sort, relying on newspaper accounts of campaign rhetoric, can aspire to complete objectivity, but this typology at least affords one means of comparing the campaign racial stances of governors over a period of time and between subregions. The results appear to be, to borrow one of Key's phrases, "within shouting distance of the realities."

Slightly less than half (45 percent) of the southern governorships between 1954 and 1969 were won by politicians whose campaigns were characterized by a militant defense of racial segregation. (Percentages mentioned here and in the following paragraphs are taken from Table 4.) Campaigners who satisfied *at least one* (most met more) of the following criteria have been considered *strong* or *militant segregationists*:

(1) The candidate expresses unambiguous, emphatic, and more or less unqualified opposition to racial desegregation and support for racial segregation. No countervailing values (e.g., the duty to comply with federal court orders) that would dilute this commitment to the maintenance of a caste system are recognized.

(2) The candidate makes his defense of racial segregation (or opposition to desegregation, HEW guidelines, etc.) a leading campaign theme. The segregation issue is discussed incessantly and can be traced in most campaign speeches.

(3) The candidate appeals to racial prejudice (e.g., designating an opponent as the "NAACP candidate") to discredit his opposition.

Though found in far greater proportion in the Deep South (70 percent during the period 1954-69) than in the Peripheral South (30 percent), militant segregationists were elected governor of every

southern state at some point after the *Brown* decision.   Representa-
tive strong segregationists include Mississippi's Ross Barnett, Ala-
bama's George Wallace, and Virginia's Lindsay Almond.   Typical
statements from Barnett's 1959 campaign illustrate, in an extreme
form, the militants' opposition to racial change.   "I don't believe
God meant for the races to be integrated," he told Mississippi audi-
ences.   "God placed the black man in Africa and separated the
white man from him with a body of water."   Barnett described him-
self as a "firm and un-wavering believer in the complete segregation
of the races" and believed even token school desegregation would
have disastrous consequences.   "Integration has ruined every com-
munity in which it has been practiced," he asserted.   "I would
rather lose my life than to see Mississippi schools integrated."[14]

Approximately one-third (32 percent) of the post-*Brown* gov-
ernors shared the militants' antipathy for racial desegregation with-
out treating segregation as an issue of commanding importance.
Governors who described themselves as racial segregationists in
their campaigns but who did not meet the criteria established for
strong segregationists have been designated *moderate segregation-
ists*.   The adjective "moderate" is employed merely for want of a
better term.   Since the word is frequently used by militant segre-
gationists to describe a white who seems insufficiently committed to
the caste system, it should be noted that no such connotation is im-
plied in this paper.   Here all moderates are segregationists.   The
following statements apply to most moderates:

(1) The candidate favors racial segregation and opposes de-
    segregation, but these preferences are usually qualified by
    other values and commitments.   While promising to do his
    best to preserve segregation or limit desegregation, he often
    expresses his intention to respect decisions of the federal
    judiciary.
(2) The candidate does not make the defense of racial segrega-
    tion a leading campaign issue.   Racial segregation is sup-
    ported primarily as a matter of regional tradition, a com-
    mitment routinely expected of serious office-seekers.   Ref-

[14]Jackson *Clarion-Ledger*, June 14; July 2, 15-16, 1959.

erences to segregation tend to be brief and perfunctory; campaign speeches typically focus on non-racial issues.

(3) The candidate avoids appealing to racial prejudice to discredit his opposition. On the contrary, more militant opponents may be attacked for race-baiting.

Victorious moderate segregationists include Georgia's Carl Sanders (in 1962), Florida's LeRoy Collins, and Louisiana's Earl Long. Sanders's 1962 campaign against former Governor Marvin Griffin, a strong segregationist of the Eugene Talmadge school, exemplifies the approach of the moderate segregationist. The candidate called for law and order and denounced Griffin as an "agitator." While Sanders promised to employ "every legal means to preserve segregation of the races in Georgia," he would never "put a padlock on a school house." "I am a segregationist," Sanders said. "I believe in equal opportunity but if I am elected governor I will not tolerate race-baiting or race-mixing."[15]

Southern office-seekers traditionally supported the region's caste system. Depending upon the situation, racial segregation might or might not become an explicit issue in pre-*Brown* campaigns, but it could safely be assumed that all serious politicians regarded themselves as racial segregationists. Candidates who doubted the justice of the social order did not ordinarily share their reservations with the electorate. In view of the tenacity of southern racial norms, the emergence of *non-segregationists* is a development of considerable significance. Non-segregationists won nearly one-quarter (23 percent) of the governor's races from 1954-69. This category is purposively inclusive. The non-segregationist classification might have been subdivided into racial neutrals or indifferents, moderate integrationists, and strong integrationists, but too few non-segregationists have been elected governor to justify such a detailed breakdown. Non-segregationists range from a minority of governors who adopted fairly explicit pro-civil rights stances to politicians who simply chose, for varying reasons, not to identify themselves publicly as racial segregationists. Many of these governors, then, were essentially indifferent to the merits of segregation versus

[15]Atlanta *Constitution*, July 13, 27; Aug. 8, 16, 1962.

desegregation in their campaigns and sought generally to be as non-committal as possible concerning the caste system.   These politicians usually fell into one of the following categories:

(1) Whatever his private beliefs, the candidate does not campaign openly as a segregationist.   For all practical purposes, he seeks to avoid explicit stands on racial issues; he champions neither segregation nor desegregation.

(2) The candidate does not describe himself as a segregationist or as an integrationist, but he expresses qualified support for some black demands.   Statements concerning race tend to be indirect and highly abstract (e.g., the candidate favors "equality of opportunity").   Black support is welcomed.

(3) The candidate explicitly and unambiguously favors various Negro rights.   Racial segregation may be explicitly repudiated; black support is welcomed.

No more than a curiosity in the Deep South,[16] non-segregationists won a third of the Peripheral South governorships from 1954-69. Examples include Tennessee's Buford Ellington (in 1966), Texas's John Connally, Arkansas's Winthrop Rockefeller, and Virginia's Linwood Holton.   While Ellington's remarks in his 1966 campaign are *not* representative of most non-segregationists, they serve as a concrete example of political change.   The self-proclaimed "old-fashioned segregationist" of the 1958 gubernatorial campaign told Tennesseans that he had changed his mind concerning racial segregation:

> Change is an ever constant factor in men's culture.   Values change.   Standards change.   Convictions change.   Change is the theme of social growth.

[16]The sole Deep-South non-segregationist in this period was a borderline case.   Louisiana's John McKeithen avoided racial issues in his 1967 campaign for re-election.   After the election was over McKeithen told a New Orleans civic group that "We believe in equal opportunity for all.   We want Negroes in state government and jobs, the state police.   Thank goodness for this old Southern state—it has finally turned the clock and got into the 20th Century." New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, Nov. 16, 1967.

FIGURE 1

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CAMPAIGN STANCES ON RACIAL SEGREGATION, 1950-69, BY SUB-REGION

> I say this by way of making a frank face-up to the matter of discrimination on account of race and color. I am sure that all Americans are agreed that the word segregation . . . based on race . . . is a term that is obsolete.
>   . . . Let's bury the word and practice of segregation. Let's stay in step with the times.[17]

The rise and partial decline of the segregation controversy in recent southern electoral politics is evident in Figure 1, which graphs the campaign racial stances of Deep-South and Peripheral-South governors since 1950.[18] For most governors in the pre-*Brown* years, racial segregation was a latent or, at most, a secondary issue. No one was elected governor who questioned the merits of the caste system, yet only a small minority, unevenly distributed even within the Deep South, campaigned as militant segregationists. The average governor (86 percent) ran as a moderate segregationist. These politicians would affirm their loyalty to southern racial customs if circumstances required it; otherwise, they ignored the topic or minimized the relevance of the segregation issue by arguing that the Negro's "place" was a closed question. Southern apologists have often contended that the *Brown* decision undermined race relations in the region and that southerners were slowly "working out the problem" on their own. An examination of the tone and content of campaign rhetoric in the early 1950s indicates the mythical nature of this belief. The relative absence of stem-winding racist oratory in southern campaigns did not signify any gradual internal transformation of a segregated social order. A few white politicians did propose that steps be taken to improve the quality of black education, but certainly no successful candidate argued against the principle of racially segregated public schools. The belated interest in Negro education was mainly an effort to put a measure of equality into the "separate but equal" doctrine.[19]

[17]Nashville *Banner*, June 24, 1966.

[18]Graphs used in this paper are based on five periods of four years, beginning in 1950. Because all of the southern states except Arkansas and Texas (and Tennessee until 1954) elect governors for four-year terms, each period includes data on two governors for those states with two-year terms and on one governor for the remaining states.

[19]For an analysis of the segregation issue in pre-*Brown* gubernatorial cam-

Southern campaigners responded predictably once the Supreme Court ordered school desegregation. Ambitious politicians, to put it mildly, perceived few incentives to advocate compliance. In the mid-1950s, blacks were generally ill-organized politically; whites did most of the voting and preferred racial segregation; and neither the President nor the Congress appeared anxious to help the Supreme Court implement school desegregation. Campaigners consequently denounced the *Brown* decision. Militants won 43 percent of the southern governorships from 1954 to 1957, again outnumbered by moderate segregationists (57 percent). Had the Supreme Court ordered immediate desegregation, instead of compliance "with all deliberate speed," the percentage of strong segregationists would doubtless have been considerably higher.

Militant segregationists reached the height of their regional influence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, often in direct response to the 1957 school desegregation crisis in Little Rock. The political rewards of conspicuously defying federal authority were demonstrated to white politicians across the South by Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus's landslide re-election in 1958. Seventy-seven percent of the gubernatorial contests from 1958-61 were won by militants, a showing approached by no other type of candidate at any time after 1954. Only two moderate segregationists were successful during this period, and, for the first time, a borderline non-segregationist was elected.[20]

To an inordinate degree, elections for governor during the first eight years after the *Brown* decision reflected the white South's determination to perpetuate racial segregation. Three-fifths (59 percent) of the governorships were captured by strong segregationists, another third went to moderate segregationists, and the remaining contest was won by a non-segregationist. Militancy was particularly evident in the Deep South, where 80 percent of the governors

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paigns, see Earl Black, "Southern Governors and the Negro: Race as a Campaign Issue since 1954" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1968), 52-80.

[20]In contrast with his previous campaigns, Texas Governor Price Daniel in 1960 did not discuss racial segregation.

from 1954 to 1961, compared with 47 percent in the Peripheral South, campaigned as strong segregationists.

Despite the Wallace movement, the consensus among white southern politicians concerning racial segregation increasingly evaporated in the 1960s. Half as many strong segregationists (38 percent) were elected in the South from 1962 to 1965 as were chosen during the previous four years. The percentage of moderate segregationists doubled (31 percent), and, more significantly, there was a fourfold increase (31 percent) among non-segregationists.

The regional trend toward fewer winning segregationists (whether militants or moderates) accelerated in the last half of the 1960s. Data on the 13 governorships decided from 1966-69 clearly indicate the erosion of the white South's traditional solidarity regarding racial segregation. Militant segregationists won 23 percent of the elections, less than one-third of their victories in the late 1950s, and moderates accounted for another 23 percent. For the first time in the history of the modern South, half of the region's governors campaigned as non-segregationists. The ability of non-segregationists to *survive* the electoral process is one indication that significant political change was occurring in the South.

Two factors—the role of the federal government and Negro voting—appear of central importance in the decline of segregationist campaign rhetoric in the 1960s. The occasional intervention of the federal executive to impose school desegregation gradually expanded the arena of racial conflict from small, isolated southern constituencies to Washington, thus making it more difficult for local whites to preserve total racial segregation.[21] A series of federal-

[21]E. E. Schattschneider has argued that "the scope of a conflict determines its outcome" and that Negro civil rights is a kind of issue that benefits from broad attention. *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 7-8 and *passim*. More recently, Grant McConnell has stressed the importance of constituency size as a factor in resolving racial (and other) issues. As long as decisions affecting Negroes were confined to the local level, blacks could expect little sympathy for their grievances. *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966), 91-118, 176-178. On the application of federal pressure for (limited) racial change, see, e.g., Anthony Lewis *et al.*, *Portrait of a Decade* (New York: Random House, 1964), 104-124; and Harold C. Fleming, "The Federal Executive and Civil Rights: 1961-1965," in *The Negro American*, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 371-399.

state confrontations, all lost by the militants, ultimately suggested to many politicians the futility of continued defiance on the *principle* of racial desegregation; passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 meant that white southerners could no longer claim that racial change lacked a congressional mandate. With the enactment of federal aid to education in 1965, funds being contingent upon some degree of desegregation, local school districts were given a strong economic incentive to integrate.[22] Once *widespread* (though generally token) school desegregation began, most campaigners outside the more recalcitrant Deep South states came to accept some measure of racial integration as a political reality.

TABLE 1

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CAMPAIGN STANCES ON RACIAL SEGREGATION AND DIFFERENCES IN WHITE AND BLACK VOTER REGISTRATION RATES, 1960-69

(PERCENT)

Campaign Racial Stance	Differences in Registration Rates[a]			Totals	N
	High	Medium	Low		
Strong Segregationist	70	27	10	35	(11)
Moderate Segregationist	20	55	0	26	(8)
Non-Segregationist	10	18	90	39	(12)
Totals	100	100	100	100	(31)
Number of Cases	(10)	(11)	(10)	(31)	

[a]High = 30 or more percentage points difference between percentage of eligible whites registered to vote and percentage of eligible blacks registered; Medium = 15-29.9 percentage points difference; Low = less than 15 percentage points difference. Where data were not available for the election year, the average of the preceding and succeeding years was used. For the 1969 Virginia election, 1968 estimates were employed.

Sources of voter registration estimates: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Voting*, Vol. I of *1961 Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 252-307; Watters and Cleghorn, *Climbing Jacob's Ladder*, Appendix II; and "Voter Registration in the South, Summer, 1968" (Atlanta: Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, 1968), n.p.

[22]For a detailed account of the politics of the HEW school desegregation guidelines, see Gary Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969).

The rise in black political participation in the 1960s, though one
of the most dramatic accomplishments of the civil-rights movement,
must be seen in the perspective of white participation patterns.
On the assumption that a higher level of black voter registration as
compared with white registration indirectly reflects the strength of
black political organization within a state, differences in statewide
voter registration *rates* were calculated by subtracting the percent-
age of eligible Negroes registered to vote in a given year from the
comparable white figure. As Table 1 indicates, the magnitude of
these differences in registration rates is strongly associated (gamma
= .79 and lambda b = .53) with the campaign racial stances of gov-
ernors elected in the 1960s. The more blacks have been mobilized
in rough proportion to whites, the more likely candidates have been
to avoid militantly segregationist postures. In elections where the
difference in registration rates was lower than 15 percentage points,
90 percent of the winners were non-segregationists. Where whites
have registered at significantly higher rates than blacks, successful
campaigners have commonly emphasized traditional segregationist
views. Seventy percent of the elections in which differences ex-
ceeded 30 percentage points were won by strong segregationists.
If blacks within a state become sufficiently well organized to ap-
proximate white registration levels, they may influence campaign
rhetoric (by raising the costs of race-baiting) even while constitut-
ing a small percentage of the total electorate.[23] Outside the Periph-
eral South, however, Negroes have been unable to narrow the regis-
tration gap appreciably. The difference between the registration
rates of whites and blacks in the Deep South declined from 41.9
percentage points in 1964 to 26.4 points in 1968. Comparable
figures for the Peripheral South are 7.4 in 1964 and 9.1 in 1968.[24]

Thus the rise of the non-segregationist governor has been limited
primarily to the Peripheral South. Sixty percent (compared with
13 percent in the Peripheral South) of the winning Deep-South
candidates from 1962 to 1969 were militants and only 10 percent

[23]There is no comprehensive analysis of the relation of black voter organiza-
tions to statewide politics. For a recent study of black organizations in several
large southern cities, see Holloway, *Southern Negro,* chs. 7-10.

[24]These estimates were computed from voter registration data found in the
sources listed in Table 1.

(63 percent in the Peripheral South) were non-segregationists. The Goldwater sweep in 1964, George Wallace's ability to carry the Deep South (South Carolina excepted) in 1968, and Wallace's renomination for the Alabama governorship in 1970 indicate the persistence of racial segregation as a significant campaign issue in much of the Deep South. While unadulterated segregationist oratory may give way to comparatively subtle, euphemistic language, the transition from segregationist to non-segregationist, if it occurs at all, will be extremely difficult in states like Alabama and Mississippi. On the other hand, the principle of racial segregation is now virtually dead as an explicit campaign issue in the Peripheral South. No politician campaigning as a militant segregationist has been elected governor in that subregion since 1964, and non-segregationists have won the governorship at least twice in Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Arkansas.

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Politicians throughout the South have encouraged the development of economic systems grounded less on agriculture and more on commerce and industry. "Southern governors have become the *de facto* executive directors of the state chambers of commerce," Dunbar has written, "and spend their time competing with each other as supplicants for new plants."[25] But if the goal of economic development has been universally shared, there has been less agreement concerning what southern state governments should do to expedite economic growth. (We take for granted that southern politicians routinely support various state-authorized subsidies for new industry and invariably claim to be better qualified than their opponents to attract new payrolls into their states.) Differing conceptions of the state government's role in the encouragement of economic development are particularly significant because of the longstanding deficiencies of public education in the South. A recent analysis of the southern labor force emphasizes the relation between economic development and quality education and concludes:

> The shortages of skilled workers, of technicians, of scientists, of

[25]Leslie W. Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South: The Exposed Nerve," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (February 1964), 20.

managerial ability among small businessmen, and of risk-taking entre-
preneurs are serious stumbling blocks to further industrialization and
technological development of the South. Education and training that
sufficed for the southern agricultural labor force are not adequate to
meet the demands of today's manpower market and certainly will
not be adequate in the years to come in the industries of the South
and elsewhere in the nation.[26]

Given comparatively low standards of living and inadequate edu-
cational systems, what roles have white politicians envisioned that
state governments should play in promoting economic develop-
ment? On the basis of the governor's stance toward (1) public
education and (2) class-oriented politics, four responses will be
differentiated: *marginalist, adaptive, neo-Populist/marginalist,* and
neo-Populist/adaptive. Although we are primarily interested in
how politicians have related public education to economic develop-
ment, we also wish to isolate the few successful southern candidates
who have generally favored the expansion of redistributive eco-
nomic programs.

Nearly half (45 percent) of the gubernatorial elections held
from 1954 to 1969 were won by campaigners whose approach to
education and economic development minimized the financial re-
sponsibilities of the state. *Marginalists* have been defined as fol-
lows:

(1) The candidate does not advocate substantially increased
    state spending for public education. Although marginal
    improvements in the educational system may be favored,
    the candidate's campaign rhetoric reflects overriding con-
    cern with the present costs of state government. Economy
    in government is commonly stressed; budget cutting may
    be advised.
(2) The candidate's speeches do not reflect a view of politics
    as (more or less) a struggle between "haves" and "have-
    nots." Redistributive economic programs are not empha-
    sized.

Marginalist campaigners rarely advocated a significant expansion

[26]Maddox *et al., The Advancing South,* 208.

of social-welfare programs (e.g., old-age pensions) or aligned them-
selves noticeably with "have-not" groups within the state. Virginia's
A. S. Harrison, Texas's Allan Shivers, and Louisiana's Jimmie Davis
exemplify the marginalist. Harrison, the Byrd Organization's candi-
date in 1961, attacked his opponent's "ultra-liberal approach to state
finances" and promised to preserve Virginia's "sound, economical,
constructive, progressive, honest government." The root issue
for Harrison was whether the state would "abandon the sound po-
litical philosophies we have followed for 50 years." If the national
business community thought Virginia was becoming a "free-wheel-
ing, free-dealing, socialist, spending state, we might as well fold up
our tents and steal away as far as getting new industry is con-
cerned."[27]

A growing number of successful candidates (34 percent of the
post-*Brown* governors) have taken the position that long-range eco-
nomic growth requires far greater financial support for public edu-
cation by the states themselves. By proposing the expansion or
creation of trade schools, community colleges, state university sys-
tems, and the like, *adaptives* have attempted to enhance job op-
portunities for individuals and to make their states more attractive
to industry. Politicians who met the following criteria have been
considered adaptives:

(1) The candidate favors substantially increased state support
for public education and commonly describes the improve-
ment of education as having a high priority in his adminis-
tration. Increased expenditures for education may be ex-
plicitly defended as an investment in future economic de-
velopment.
(2) The candidate's rhetoric does not reflect a view of politics
as (more or less) a struggle between "haves" and "have-
nots." Redistributive economic programs are not empha-
sized.

Like the marginalists, adaptives have typically been indifferent, if
not hostile, to increased spending for social-welfare programs. Rep-

[27]Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, June 6-7, 1961.

resentative adaptives include Texas's John Connally (in 1964 and 1966), North Carolina's Terry Sanford, and Georgia's Carl Sanders. Campaigning for reelection in 1964, for example, Connally described his fundamental goal as an improvement of the state's educational system so that more Texans might "share in the economic fruits of the technological space age."[28]

A dwindling fraction of southern governorships (15 percent since 1954) were won by *neo-Populist/marginalists*. The campaign rhetoric of these politicians, unlike that of marginalists and adaptives, is grounded in a more or less articulate conception of politics as conflict between "haves" and have-nots." Neo-Populist/marginalists have urged the redistribution of state resources in directions calculated to benefit "have-not" groups, and this redistributive orientation distinguishes them from adaptives and marginalists. Neo-Populist/marginalists may be characterized as follows:

(1) The candidate does not advocate substantially increased state support for public education. Marginal improvements (e.g., higher teacher salaries, hot lunch programs for school-children) may be vigorously supported.

(2) The candidate's rhetoric reflects a view of politics as (more or less) a struggle between "haves" and "have-nots" (e.g., "special interests" versus "the people"). The candidate emphasizes his willingness to expand such social-welfare programs as old-age pensions.

Few campaigners of this type have been elected governor since 1954. Arkansas's Orval Faubus, who accounts for six of the eight governorships won by neo-Populist/marginalists, was the only politician of this category to succeed in the 1960s, and Faubus defies easy classification. While he originally ran as a neo-Populist/marginalist in the Sid McMath tradition, he later established close ties with leading segments of the Arkansas business community. Since his campaign rhetoric, which emphasized the redistributive achievements of his administrations, remained basically consistent over the

[28]Dallas *Morning News*, April 25, 1964.

years, he has been considered a neo-Populist/marginalist.[29] Alabama's James Folsom and Louisiana's Earl Long, both elected in the mid-1950s, were the other victorious neo-Populist/marginalists. With the exception of Faubus in his 1958 and 1960 campaigns, these politicians have run as moderate segregationists.

Over a period of time neo-Populists have become more aware of developmental questions, so that it is possible to identify a small but influential group of *neo-Populist/adaptives.* This category combines the redistributive perspective of the neo-Populist/marginalist with the adaptive's concern for public education. Neo-Populist/ adaptives, who won six percent of the post-*Brown* governorships, may be described as follows:

(1) The candidate favors substantially increased state support for public education and commonly describes the improvement of education as having a high priority in his administration. Increased expenditures for education may be explicitly defended as an investment in future economic development.

(2) The candidate's rhetoric reflects a view of politics as (more or less) a struggle between "haves" and "have-nots" (e.g., "special interests" versus "the people"). The candidate emphasizes his willingness to expand such social-welfare programs as old-age pensions.

Georgia's Lester Maddox and Alabama's George and Lurleen Wallace, all of whom were militant segregationists, were the only successful neo-Populist/adaptives from 1954 to 1969. As George Wallace's career illustrates, the fusion of racism with welfare politics has been a potent combination in Alabama.[30] Though his economic proposals received far less attention than his bizarre views on race, Maddox wanted to double educational expenditures in Georgia and denounced his Republican opponent as a rich man who "would be a lot better off if he knew about people as well as dollars." While

[29]On Faubus's career, see Roy Reed, "Another Face of Orval Faubus," *New York Times Magazine,* Oct. 9, 1966, 44 ff.; and Sherrill, *Gothic Politics,* 110-114.

[30]See Frady, *Wallace.*

he led Georgia, Maddox said, there would be "no more of the rich getting richer and the poor poorer."[31]

Figure 2 graphs the economic-development position of successful gubernatorial candidates by sub-region for the period from 1950 to 1969. Roughly three-quarters of the southern governors chosen during the 1950s campaigned as marginalists, politicians who believed the state could best encourage economic growth by limiting its own spending and, using tax advantages as bait, by energetically recruiting new industry. Neo-Populist/marginalists won all but one of the remaining governorships, and campaigners like Long and Folsom were less interested in economic development per se than in redistributing existing resources to benefit "have-not" groups directly. Price has summarized the policy consequences of this situation: "The politics of black belt vs. non-black belt or of agrarian protest vs. Big Mules is fascinating to behold, but essentially a Merry-go-round. The most interesting thing is the campaign itself, not any substantive policy results. Such politics is cyclic, if not plain static."[32] White politicians in the 1950s were generally more interested in defending racial segregation in the public schools than in proposing or supporting any innovative, expensive role for the state's long-term economic development. At a time when many politicians contemplated closing the public schools to prevent desegregation, it made little political sense to advocate substantially higher investments in public education.

In the 1960s, as the region's need for a better educated, more skilled labor force became more obvious, and as the school desegregation controversy waned, at least in the Peripheral South, southern campaigns grew somewhat less "static." Adaptives emerged as a relatively progressive voice in southern politics, winning a majority of the governorships contested in the decade. Marginalists won less than a third as many elections (19 percent) from 1962 to 1969 as they had in the previous eight years (70 percent). The rise of

[31]Atlanta *Constitution*, Oct. 11, 15, 17; Nov. 1, 1966.

[32]Hugh Douglas Price, "Southern Politics in the Sixties: Notes on Economic Development and Political Modernization" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1964; mimeographed), 10.

FIGURE 2

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CAMPAIGN STANCES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1950-69, BY SUB-REGION

the adaptives and the decline of the marginalists occurred in both sub-regions.

Separate examinations of the racial segregation and economic-development dimensions, two fundamental components of the South's "social revolution," have demonstrated that important changes have taken place within each policy area since the *Brown* decision. If white politicians are beginning to respond to a vastly more complex socio-economic and political environment, these changes in elite orientations should be complementary.

THE POLICY DIMENSIONS COMPARED

The changing policy stances of southern governors are suggested in Table 2, which shows the distribution of the combinations of racial-segregation and economic-development categories before and after the *Brown* decision. While the typical pre-*Brown* governor (71 percent from 1950 to 1953) campaigned as a moderate segregationist and marginalist, since 1954 the modal governor across the South has been the militant segregationist/marginalist (30 percent), followed by the non-segregationist/adaptive (19 percent). Moderate segregationists who were marginalists or neo-Populist/marginalists each accounted for a tenth of the governorships. Other possible combinations occurred rarely or not at all. For example, a handful of strong segregationist/adaptives (all from the Deep South) and non-segregationist/marginalists (both from Texas) were elected. Of greater significance for southern politics, *no* non-segregationist/neo-Populist (whether marginalist or adaptive) won a governorship during the years from 1954 to 1969. A white politician might succeed as either a non-segregationist or a neo-Populist (marginalist or adaptive), but the combination was considered radical by southern standards. Such politicians as Texas's Don Yarborough, Florida's Robert King High, and Alabama's Richmond Flowers were repeatedly assailed as "ultra-liberal" and defeated.

Marginalists with militantly segregationist views, the dominant southern combination in the late 1950s (winning 48 percent of the governorships from 1954 to 1961), clearly declined in the 1960s as a regional force (12 percent from 1962 to 1969). Mississippi remains the most obvious stronghold for this type of politician. The racial stances of adaptives have shifted over time. During the early

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL SEGREGATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CATEGORIES, PRE-*Brown* AND POST-*Brown*, AMONG SOUTHERN GOVERNORS, BY REGION AND SUB-REGION (PERCENT)

Campaign Stance	Pre-*Brown* 1950-53			1954-61			Post-*Brown* 1962-69			1954-69		
	DS	PS	Reg	DS	PS	Reg	DS	PS	Reg	DS	PS	Reg
Strong Segregationist												
Marginalist	20	0	7	70	35	48	10	13	12	40	24	30
Neo-Populist/Marginalist	20	0	7	0	12	7	0	0	0	0	6	3
Neo-Populist/Adaptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	12	15	0	6
Adaptive	0	0	0	10	0	4	20	0	8	15	0	6
Moderate Segregationist												
Marginalist	40	89	71	0	29	19	0	6	4	0	18	11
Neo-Populist/Marginalist	0	11	7	20	12	15	0	13	8	10	12	11
Neo-Populist/Adaptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adaptive	20	0	7	0	6	4	30	6	15	15	6	9
Non-Segregationist												
Marginalist	0	0	0	0	6	4	0	6	4	0	6	4
Neo-Populist/Marginalist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neo-Populist/Adaptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adaptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	56	38	5	27	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Cases	(5)	(9)	(14)	(10)	(17)	(27)	(10)	(16)	(26)	(20)	(33)	(53)

Key: DS = Deep South; PS = Peripheral South; Reg = Region

TABLE 3

CAMPAIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STANCES OF SOUTHERN GOVERNORS, 1954-69, BY RACIAL SEGREGATION POSITION AND SUB-REGION
(PERCENT)

Campaign Stance on Economic Development	Campaign Stance on Racial Segregation											
	Deep South				Peripheral South				Region			
	SS	MS	NS	T	SS	MS	NS	T	SS	MS	NS	T
Marginalist	57	0	0	40	80	50	18	48	67	35	17	45
Neo-Populist/Marginalist	0	40	0	10	20	33	0	18	8	35	0	15
Neo-Populist/Adaptive	21	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	6
Adaptive	21	60	100	35	0	17	82	33	13	29	83	34
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Cases	(14)	(5)	(1)	(20)	(10)	(12)	(11)	(33)	(24)	(17)	(12)	(53)

Key: SS = Strong Segregationist; MS = Moderate Segregationist; NS = Non-Segregationist; T = Totals

Tau beta values: Deep South = .45; Peripheral South = .50; Region = .45

1960s, winning adaptives were segregationists (militant or moderate) more frequently than non-segregationists, but as the salience of the segregation issue lessened, they increasingly assumed non-segregationist stances. The modal southern governor in the last half of the 1960s, unlike his predecessors, campaigned both as a non-segregationist and as an adaptive.

Cross-tabulation of the variables indicates that, despite sub-regional differences, the dimensions of racial segregation and economic development are associated. Across the South in the years from 1954 to 1969, two-thirds of the successful militant segregationists were also marginalists and over four-fifths of the winning non-segregationists were adaptives. (See Table 3.)

The data in Tables 3 and 4 show basic sub-regional variations in the economic-development positions associated with particular stances on racial segregation. In the tradition-bound Deep South, the most significant differences with respect to economic development are those separating militant from moderate segregationists. Nearly three-fifths of the Deep-South militants were marginalists, but none of the successful moderate segregationists campaigned as undiluted marginalists. By contrast, in the comparatively open political culture of the Peripheral South, differences are more apparent between segregationists (of whatever variety) and non-segregationists. While four-fifths of the Peripheral South's militants and half of its moderates were marginalists, adaptives comprised 82 percent of the non-segregationists there. An examination of sub-regional differences between the percentage of elections won by strong segregationists and non-segregationists again reveals fundamental contrasts. For the post-*Brown* period, the Deep-South figure (65) is over 20 times greater than that of the Peripheral South (−3).

Consideration of the economic-development dimension suggests that, with several qualifications, similarities are more striking than differences. Governors in both sub-regions who adopted "traditional" (i.e., marginalist or neo-Populist/marginalist) positions on economic development generally held "traditional" views on racial segregation (i.e., strong or moderate segregationist). (See Table 4.) Deep-South adaptives were mainly militants or moderates (both 43 percent), but the relation between adaptive orientations and segregationist stances was reversed in the Peripheral South: four-fifths of the adaptives there were non-segregationists. Aside

TABLE 4

CAMPAIGN RACIAL SEGREGATION STANCES OF SOUTHERN GOVERNORS, 1954-69,
BY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POSITION AND SUB-REGION

(PERCENT)

Campaign Stance on Racial Segregation	Campaign Stance on Economic Development														
	Deep South					Peripheral South					Region				
	M	NP/M	NP/A	A	T	M	NP/M	NP/A	A	T	M	NP/M	NP/A	A	T
Strong Segregationist	100	0	100	43	70	50	33	0	0	30	67	25	100	17	45
Moderate Segregationist	0	100	0	43	25	38	67	0	18	36	25	75	0	28	32
Non-Segregationist	0	0	0	14	5	13	0	0	82	33	8	0	0	55	23
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Cases	(8)	(2)	(3)	(7)	(20)	(16)	(6)	(0)	(11)	(33)	(24)	(8)	(3)	(18)	(53)

Key: M = Marginalist; NP/M = Neo-Populist/Marginalist; NP/A = Neo-Populist/Adaptive; A = Adaptive
Tau beta values: Deep South = .45; Peripheral South = .50; Region = .45

from the inability of neo-Populist/adaptives to win Peripheral-South governorships, economic-development types have done about as well in one sub-region as in the other, and the difference between the percentage of elections won by marginalists and adaptives is actually smaller for the Deep South (5) than for the Peripheral South (15). Primarily because racial segregation has been the inherently more controversial and divisive issue, distinctive sub-regional patterns have been more apparent for racial segregation than for economic development.

CONCLUSIONS

We have argued that a growing percentage of successful contenders for southern governorships may be described as non-segregationists and that the appearance of these candidates is one indication of meaningful political change in the South. Compared with the political atmosphere of the late 1950s and early 1960s, considerable progress has been made, in many states, toward eliminating or reducing the explicitness of the more blatant forms of race-baiting. In most Peripheral-South campaigns the principle of racial segregation is a dead or dying issue, and truculent demands for the preservation of racial segregation have frequently been replaced by more euphemistic language in the Deep South. Since the *Brown* decision, the spectrum of politically feasible expression on matters concerning the caste system has broadened significantly, especially in the Peripheral South.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that the decline of segregationist oratory, where it has occurred, has not been accompanied by much specific attention to the socio-economic needs of black southerners. Progress in civil rights, as measured by the campaign rhetoric of white politicians, has been more verbal than substantive. Because of the minority position of blacks and the indifference or hostility of many whites, it seems improbable that many white candidates will use campaigns to articulate fundamental problems—employment, education, housing, law enforcement, and welfare—of blacks in the South. Black gains have been associated more with "Liberty" than with "Equality."[33] The right to

[33]See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family," in Parsons and Clark, *Negro American*, 134-135.

participate in politics has largely been won, but the concept of "equal results" has not been seriously raised in state campaigns. Moreover, the decline of explicitly segregationist rhetoric does not necessarily mean that white politicians have given up "race" as a campaign issue. Our concern has been to trace changing elite attitudes toward racial segregation, an important but not the sole indicator of the race issue. Many white candidates have and will find ways to appeal to anti-black prejudices without describing themselves as segregationists.

While the shifts that have occurred in the campaign rhetoric of many governors are less than monumental and fall exceedingly short of the region's needs, they should not be dismissed as trivial. As Dunbar has suggested, southern history provides a perspective for evaluating the events of the last two decades:

> . . . (W)e can note that any government has but three possible postures toward the question of racial equality: in favor, opposed, or neutral. The political theory of the South has for more than three centuries been grounded on the principle of white supremacy. It has been the cardinal doctrine. If . . . southern state governments were to follow the lead already given by some municipalities, and move from opposition to neutrality, this would be a truly historic change.[34]

A systematic analysis of racial segregation as a campaign issue indicates that, particularly in the Peripheral South, signs of a shift by white elites "from opposition to neutrality" have become more and more visible.

During the 1960s many governors also reached a new understanding of the state's role in promoting economic development. Numerous white politicians have become less concerned with the size of the state budget and more willing to support substantially higher state spending for public education as a long-range investment in economic development. By the end of the 1960s, then, many southern governors could be differentiated from their predecessors by a comparatively reduced preoccupation with the principle of racial segregation and by a heightened interest in adaptive economic-development policies. A sizeable number of white politicians, in short, were *beginning* to frame issues of greater relevance to the needs of the contemporary South.

[34]Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South," 18.

APPENDIX

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CAMPAIGN STANCES ON RACIAL SEGREGATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1950-69

	Deep South			Peripheral South	
Governor	Year Elected	Classi-fication	Governor	Year Elected	Classi-fication
Alabama			**Arkansas**		
G. Persons	1950	MS M	S. McMath	1950	MS NP/M
J. Folsom	1954	MS NP/M	F. Cherry	1952	MS M
J. Patterson	1958	SS M	O. Faubus	1954	MS NP/M
G. Wallace	1962	SS NP/A	O. Faubus	1956	MS NP/M
L. Wallace	1966	SS NP/A	O. Faubus	1958	SS NP/M
Georgia			O. Faubus	1960	SS NP/M
			O. Faubus	1962	MS NP/M
H. Talmadge	1950	SS NP/M	O. Faubus	1964	MS NP/M
M. Griffin	1954	SS M	W. Rockefeller	1966	NS A
E. Vandiver	1958	SS M	W. Rockefeller	1968	NS A
C. Sanders	1962	MS A	**Florida**		
L. Maddox	1966	SS NP/A	D. McCarty	1952	MS M
Louisiana		..	L. Collins	1954	MS M
R. Kennon	1951-52	MS M	L. Collins	1956	MS M
E. Long	1955-56	MS NP/M	F. Bryant	1960	SS M
J. Davis	1959-60	SS* M	H. Burns	1964	SS M
J. McKeithen	1963-64	SS* A	C. Kirk	1966	MS M
J. McKeithen	1967	NS A	**North Carolina**		
Mississippi			W. Umstead	1952	MS M
H. White	1951	SS* M	L. Hodges	1956	MS M
J. Coleman	1955	SS M	T. Sanford	1960	MS A
R. Barnett	1959	SS M	D. Moore	1964	SS* M
P. Johnson	1963	SS A	R. Scott	1968	MS A
J. Williams	1967	SS M	**Tennessee**		
South Carolina			G. Browning	1950	MS M
J. Byrnes	1950	MS A	F. Clement	1952	MS M
G. Timmerman	1954	SS M	F. Clement	1954	MS M
E. Hollins	1958	SS A	B. Ellington	1958	SS M
D. Russell	1962	MS A	F. Clement	1962	NS A
R. McNair	1966	MS A	B. Ellington	1966	NS A
			Texas		
			A. Shivers	1950	MS M
			A. Shivers	1952	MS M
			A. Shivers	1954	SS M

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APPENDIX

(CONTINUED)

Deep South			Peripheral South		
Governor	Year Elected	Classi-fication	Governor	Year Elected	Classi-fication
			Texas (cont.)		
			P. Daniel	1956	SS* M
			P. Daniel	1958	MS M
			P. Daniel	1960	NS M
			J. Connally	1962	NS M
			J. Connally	1964	NS A
			J. Connally	1966	NS A
			P. Smith	1968	NS A
			Virginia		
			T. Stanley	1953	MS M
			L. Almond	1957	SS M
			A. Harrison	1961	SS M
			M. Godwin	1965	NS A
			L. Holton	1969	NS A

*Indicates governors who switched from a moderate segregationist position in the Democratic first primary to a strong segregationist stance in the Democratic second primary.

Key: SS = Strong Segregationist; MS = Moderate Segregationist; NS = Non-Segregationist; M = Marginalist; A = Adaptive; NP/M = Neo-Populist/Marginalist; NP/A = Neo-Populist/Adaptive